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CONDITIONAL VENDOR'S RIGHT TO SUE A THIRD
PARTY FOR INJURY TO HIS SECURITY INTEREST
Bell Fin. Co. v. Gefter,
147 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. 1958)
The conditional vendor's assignee sued the defendant, who was
not a party to the conditional sales contract, for negligently damaging
the automobile under contract. The court held that the assignee could
recover for the full damage to the automobile, notwithstanding the
conditional vendee was not in default when the action was brought
and it was not shown how much was owed to the vendor under the
contract.
Where a conditional vendee' is in default on his contract payments,
it is generally held that the conditional vendor may sue a third-party
tort-feasor for injury to the chattel' since, it is reasoned, he then has
a right to possession of the chattel.3
1 The vendee's remedy is usually treated separately from the vendor's and a
vendee in possession may sue a tortfeasor for the whole damage to the property
since he has a right to beneficial enjoyment. If the vendee is in default he may
sue as bailee of the property. J. P. (Bum) Gibbins, Inc. v. Utah Home Fire Ins.
Co., 202 F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1953) ; Rasmus v. Schaffer, 230 Ala. 245, 160 So. 244
(1935); Smith v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 208 Ala. 440, 94 So. 489 (1922) ;
Bradley v. Wood, 207 Ala. 602, 93 So.'534 (1922) ; Pickwick Stages Corp. v. Gil,
38 Ariz. 7, 296 Pac. 269 (1931); General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Row, 208
Ark. 951, 188 S.W.2d 507 (1945) ; Smith v. Gufford, 36 Fla. 481, 18 So. 717 (1895)
(dictum); Miller and Kizer v. Des Moines City Ry., 196 Iowa 1033, 195 N.W. 600
(1923) ; Downey v. Bay State St. Ry., 225 Mass. 281, 114 N.E. 207 (1916); Dyer v.
Great Northern Ry., 51 Minn. 345, 53 N.W. 714 (1892); Lacey v. Great Northern
Ry., 70 Mont. 346, 225 Pac. 808 (1924) (dictum); Union Ry. v. Remedial Fin. Co.,
163 Tenn. 130, 40 S.W.2d 1034 (1931). (dictum); Carolina C.&O. R.R. v. Unaka
Springs Lumber Co., 130 Tenn. 354, 170 S.W. 591 (1914); Lord v. Buchanan,
69 Vt. 320, 37 At. 1048 (1897) ; Helf v. Hansen and Keller Truck Co., 167 Wash.
206, 9 P.2d 110 (1932) ; Oros v. Allen, 133 Wash. 268, 233 Pac. 314 (1925) ; 47 Am.
JUR. Sales § 879 (1943); VOLD, SALES 274 (1931); 2 WILLISTON, SALES § 333a
(1948).
2 Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Miller, 209 Ala. 378, 96 So. 322 (1923);
Malden Center Garage, Inc. v. Berkowitz, 269 Mass. 303, 168 N.E. 916 (1929)
(equitable replevin) ; First Nat. Acceptance Corp. v. Annett, 121 N.J. Law 356,
2 A.2d 650, aff'd, 124 N.J. Law 78, 11 A.2d 106 (1938) (by implication); Com-
mercial Credit Corp. v. Satterthwaite, 107 N.J. Law 17, 150 At. 235 (1930), aff'd,
108 N.J. Law 188, 154 At. 769 (1931) ; Union Ry. v. Remedial Fin. Co., 163 Tenn.
130, 40 S.W.2d 1034 (1931) (by implication). The following courts also require
that there be a default, stating that the vendor must have the right to possession:
Universal Credit Co. v. Collier, 108 Ind. App. 685, 31 N.E.2d 428 (1941) ; Gas
City Transfer Co. v. Miller, 107 Ind. App. 210, 21 N.E.2d 428 (1939), (by impli-
cation, requires a default) ; Tower v. Haslam, 84 Me. 86, 24 At. 587 (1891).
(conversion); C.I.T. Corp. v. Morse, 42 Ohio App. 94, 181 N.E. 265 (1931)
(replevin).
3The carefully drawn conditional sales contract usually provides in express
terms that upon default the vendor may retake. However, even without the clause
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In a few cases, where there had not been a default by the vendee,
the vendor's action against a third-party tortfeasor was dismissed on
the ground that he did not have the right of possession.4 However,
in other cases, a vendor has been allowed to sue the tortfeasor where
there was no default5 or where there was a subsequent default,' on
the theory that a vendor has a sufficient interest in the chattel as holder
of legal title.
7
The present case is significant in two respects. First, the vendor's
assignee was allowed recovery where the vendee was not in default
on the theory that his legal title was sufficient in itself to maintain
suit.' Second, recovery of the full amount of damage by the vendor
was permitted without regard to or inquiry concerning the amount still
due. The court stated that any recovery in excess of the debt would
be held for the benefit of the vendee. 9 Prior to this case, the authority
on the subject restricted the recovery by the vendor to the unpaid
the same result is reached by interpretation of the general clause which reserves
the property to the seller. See VOLD, SALES 287 n.n. 28, 29 (1931).
4 Gas City Transfer Co. v. Miller, 107 Ind. App. 210, 2 N.E.2d 646 (1939).
Also see Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Miller, 209 Ala. 378, 96 So. 322 (1923)
and Universal Credit Co. v. Collier, 108 Ind. App. 685, 31 N.E.2d 646 (1941).
r First Nat'l Acceptance Corp. v. Annett, 121 N.J. Law 356, 2 A.2d 650, aff'd,
124 N.J. Law 78, 11 A.2d 106 (1938) ("Obviously it is no concern of the third
party whether . . . there has or has not been a default. . . .") ; Ryals v. Seaboard
Air-Line Ry., 158 Ga. 303, 123 S.E. 12 (1934) (no default) ; Rentz v. Huckabee
Auto Co., 53 Ga. App. 329 (1936) ; Kent v. Buck, 45 Vt. 18 (1872).
6 Commercial Credit Corp. v. Satterthwaite, 107 N.J. Law 17, 150 Atl. 235
(1930), aff'd, 108 N.J. Law 188, 154 At. 769 (1931). In this case the contributory
negligence of the vendee did not bar the vendor. Since any recovery by a vendor
would be applied to the debt, a vendee might get around the contributory negli-
gence rule by purposely defaulting and urging the vendor to sue the third party.
This situation has been overruled by statute in New Jersey where contributory
negligence of a vendee, bailee or other owner of special property is a valid defense
and bar to an action by the conditional vendor or bailor. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:36-1
(1939). In Lacey v. Great Northern R. Co., 70 Mont. 346, 225 Pac. 808 (1924), the
contributory negligence of the vendee was said not to be a bar to the vendor.
However, this case was reversed on other grounds.
7 Smith v. Gufford, 36 Fla. 481, 18 So. 717 (1895); Ryals v. Seaboard Air-
Line Ry., 158 Ga. 303, 123 S.E. 12 (1924); Rentz v. Huckabee Auto Co., 53 Ga.
App. 329, 185 S.E. 575 (1938) ; Lacey v. Great Northern R. Co., 70 Mont. 346,
225 Pac. 808 (1924); Carolina C.&.O. R. Co. v. Unaka Springs Lumber Co., 130
Tenn. 354, 170 S.W. 591 (1914) (dictum-the vendee sued in this case).
8The court in the present case quotes the opinion of Delano v. Smith, 206
Mass. 365, 369-70, 92 N.E. 500, 501 (1910). In allowing a mortgagee to sue a
third-party tortfeasor, the court in the Delano case said: "Such a right of action
is founded not on right to present possession, but on title to the estate." See also
note 5, supra.
0 Apparently there was doubt as to the amount still owed the vendor and
the court allowed $250, full damage to the automobile. Cf. Harris v. Seaboard
Air-Line Ry., 190 N.C. 480, 130 S.E. 319 (1925); Lord v. Buchanan, 69 Vt. 320,
37 At. 1048 (1897) where the vendee holds in trust for the vendor any amount
of recovery in excess of his own interest.
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balance' ° unless the vendee had consented to full recovery. A recovery
or settlement in good faith by either the vendor or vendee should bar
the other if it was for the full damage caused."
The Uniform Commercial Code expressly covers this problem
and may have influenced the court's decision since it had been adopted
in Massachusetts although it is not effective until October 1, 1958.2
Section 2-722 provides:
Where a third party so deals with goods which have been
identified to a contract for sale as to cause actionable injury
to a party to that contract
(a) a right of action against the third party is in either
party to the contract for sale who has title to or a
security interest, or a special property or an insurable
interest in the goods; and if the goods have been
destroyed or converted a right of action is also in the
party who either bore the risk of loss under the
contract for sale or has since the injury assumed
that risk as against the other;
(b) if at the time of the injury the party plaintiff did not
bear the risk of loss as against the other party to
the contract for sale and there is no arrangement
between them for disposition of the recovery, his
suit, or settlement is, subject to his own interest, as
a fiduciary for the other party to the contract;
10 Ryals v. Seaboard Air-Line Ry., 158 Ga. 303, 123 S.E. 12 (1924); Rentz
v. Huckabee Auto Co., 53 Ga. App. 329, 185 S.E. 575 (1936) (dictum) ; Ellis Motor
Co. v. Hancock, 38 Ga. App. 788, 145 S.E. 518 (1928) (dictum) ; Lacey v. Great
Northern R. Co., 70 Mont. 346, 225 Pac. 808, 38 A.L.R. 1331 (1924) ; Carolina
C. & 0. R. Co. v. Unaka Springs Lumber Co., 130 Tenn. 354, 170 S.W. 591 (1914)
(dictum).
11Harris v. Seaboard Air-Line Ry., 190 N.C. 480, 130 S.E. 319 (1925);
Carolina C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Unaka Springs Lumber Co., 130 Tenn. 354, 170 S.W.
591 (1941) (dictum) ; Lord v. Buchanan, 69 Vt. 320, 27 At. 1048 (1897). See also
Motor Fin. Co. v. Noyes, 139 Me. 159, 28 A.2d 235 (1942) ; Stotts v. Puget Sound
Traction, Light & Power Co., 94 Wash. 339, 162 Pac. 519 (1917) (a conditional
vendor who appears as a witness for the buyer in an action for damages waives
his right to maintain a separate action) ; Universal Credit Co. v. Collier, 108 Ind.
App. 685, 31 N.E.2d 646 (1941); Rentz v. Huckabee Auto Co., 53 Ga. App. 329,
185 S.E. 375 (1936) ; Ellis Motor Co. v. Hancock, 38 Ga. App. 788, 145 S.E. 518
(1928) (a fair settlement with the vendee is a bar to the vendor). Cf. French v.
Osmer, 67 Vt. 427, 32 Atl. 254 (1895). In Union Ry. v. Remedial Finance Co., 163
Tenn. 130, 40 S.W.2d 1034 (1931), the administrator of the vendee, in suing the
tortfeasor, failed to present evidence on damage to the automobile, although he
recovered for personal injuries to the vendee. A later suit by the vendor for value
of the auto was held to be barred-the court rejecting the argument that it had
not been tried on the "merits." Query, could the vendor sue the administrator for
negligence in prosecuting the suit.
12 MASS. ANN. LAws c. 106 (1957) (eff. October 1, 1958).
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(c) either party may with the consent of the other sue
for the benefit of whom it may concern.1
3
The Ohio statute' 4 does not cover this problem and no case in
Ohio has been found which parallels the present one. Analogies, how-
ever, may be drawn to bailments, real estate mortgages, and chattel
mortgagesyi A bailor, 16 as owner of the general property and entitled
to future possession, may maintain an action against a third party and
recover for full damage done to the chattel. A real estate mortgagee,
as holder of the security tide, may also maintain an action for injury
to his security interest.' 7 There is a conflict of authority whether the
mortgagee's "interest" includes any damage to the land or whether the
sufficiency of the unimpaired portion will be considered in awarding
damages to the security interest.'" Although analogies to real estate
mortgages and bailments tend to support the result reached in the
present case, a similar comparison with existing Ohio law on chattel
mortgages will not. In Commercial Credit Co. v. Standard Baking
13The comment to the section states that one of the purposes is: "To adopt
and extend somewhat the principle of the statutes which provide for suit by the
real party in interest."
14 0Hio REV. CODE §§ 1319.11-.16 (1953). Section 1319.14 (1953) requires,
upon retaking of possession, a tender to the vendee of not less than fifty per cent
of the amount paid after deducting a reasonable amount for the use of the chattels.
If twenty-five per cent or less has been paid, the vendor does not need to return any
money to the vendee. From this it might be argued that the vendee must sue since
allowing the vendor to sue would be, in effect, to allow repossession without compli-
ance with the statute. If there has been no default by the vendee it would be
repossessing illegally. Of course, this argument has less chance of success when
made collaterally by the tortfeasor.
15'Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE art. 9 (1957), which treats all security
devices the same.
16 Nosse v. Rose, 45 Ohio App. 54, 186 N.E. 622 (1933) (dicta). In Gfell v.
The Jefferson Hardware Co., 10 Ohio App. 427, 31 C.C.R. (n.s.) 214 (1917), the
court held that the owner of property in the hands of a bailee may recover from a
third person damage caused to such property by the negligence of the third person,
even though the bailee is guilty of contributory negligence in the handling of the
property and even if the bailee, in an action brought by him, might be met with
the defense of contributory negligence. See 7 OHIo JUR.2d Bailments § 37 (1954),
RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 220, 243 (1934-). See also annot. 166 A.L.R. 206 (1947)
and annot. 118 A.L.R. 1338 (1939).
17Toledo v. Brown, 130 Ohio St. 513, 200 N.E. 750 (1936); Carpenter v.
Cincinnati & C.W. Canal Co., 35 Ohio St. 307 (1880); Smith v. Altick 24 Ohio St.
369 (1873) ; Allison v. McCune, 15 Ohio 726 (1846); Yahrus v. Stevens, 7 Ohio
L. Abs. 200, 29 Ohio L. Rep. 81 (Ohio App. 1929); Massachusetts Institute of
Tech. v. Spitzer, 5 Ohio L. Abs. 549 (Ohio App. 1927); Harrison v. Village of
Sabina, 1 Ohio C.C. Dec. 30, 1 Ohio C.C. 49 (Ohio App. 1885). See Denton,
Right of a Mortgagee to Recover Damages from a Third Party for Injury to
Mortgaged Property in Ohio, 3 OHIO ST. L.J. 161 (1937). In Denton, op. cit. supra
at 164, it is pointed out that the Ohio cases have dealt with wilful tort injuries and
not injuries caused by negligence.
Is See the discussion in Denton, op. cit. supra at 167, n. 17.
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Co."9 it was held that the chattel mortgagee was not the "real party in
interest ' 20 and could not sue a third party for negligently injuring the
chattel--even though the condition, which gave the mortgagee a right
to possession, had been broken. It was declared that the mortgagee had
"temporarily waived his legal right to declare the mortgage condition
broken" by failing to foreclose. 21 The court seemed to be concerned
mainly with an avoidance of the rule of contributory negligence and
recovery from insurance companies through connivance with an insol-
vent mortgagor. The real estate mortgage cases were distinguished ;ince
they dealt with willful torts and not negligence and the injury was to
land and not to chattels. Other than the argument of avoidance of
contributory negligence, it is difficult to find a logical basis for these
distinctions.22
The result of the present case and the Uniform Commercial Code
-allowing the vendor to sue before default and recover total damages
-raises several problems. (1) It is not clear whether both the vendor
and vendee may sue in two different actions or whether the first party
to sue will recover full damage which would bar further suits. Two
separate suits seem undesirable due to additional time and expense
required plus the possibility of overlapping damages being awarded by
different juries.2" (2) A recovery by the vendor before default
accelerates future installment payments to which, although his security
may be damaged, he is not then entitled. This may impose hardship
on the vendee if he does not have sufficient funds to repair the chattel
which otherwise may not be usable. 24  (3) The vendor may be over-
compensated if the court does not discount any prospective recovery
to its present value in applying it to the installment debt. (4) Any
recovery in excess of the debt is to be held for the benefit of the vendee
which may not be adequate protection for the vendee if the vendor
breaches, his fiduciary duty.
The physical injury to the vendee's possession and the impairment
of the vendor's security, are the interests which are to be protected.
1945 Ohio App. 403, 187 M4.E. 251 (1933). Cf. Capital-Loan & Say. Co. v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 44 Ohio App. 251, 184 N.E. 862 (1933), where a settle-
ment with the tortfeasor by the mortgagor was held to be a bar to the mortgagee.
20 OHIO REv. CODE § 2307.05 (1953).
21 A caveat is added in the case that there is no consideration of the question
of the situation where a mortgagee first made demand on the mortgagor to sue
and had been refused.
22 There may be a way to draft a chattel mortgage to avoid this case. Since
the language in the opinion indicates that the intent of the parties may be given
effect, it would be wise to insert a clause which gives permission to the mortgagee
to sue for the benefit of himself and the mortgagor.
23 Cf. WILLISTON, SALES § 333a (1948) where it is said that the tortfeasor
should not be obliged to pay more than full value of the goods.
24 Insurance coverage may alleviate the vendee's plight. However, in some
cases the vendor only may be covered by a policy and the insurance company
would be subrogated to his rights.
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It is here suggested that where it is feasible the vendor and vendee be
joined; otherwise the party suing should be required to give adequate
assurance for the other party's protection. Where there is joinder the
vendee should be allowed the option of receiving the recovery upon
condition of assuring the court that the vendor will have the proper
security for the unpaid balance, or of applying the amount of recovery,
discounted to its present value, to the unpaid balance.
2 5
Eugene L. Matan
25The parties may agree in the contract that one vill sue as agent for the
other. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-722(b), (c). Usually a vendor is in a
much stronger position because a "form" contract is often used which a vendee
agrees to without modification. The prudent drafter should cover this problem and
also the problem of who will bear the expense of attorney's fees in suing a third
party for injury to the chattel.
